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CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
WETLANDS LEGISLATION 
By 'Joseph W. Gannon, 'Jr::· 
In recent years several states on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts 
have enacted wetland conservation statutes.1 Although the 
statutes vary in detail, they all seek to preserve an important 
natural resource by imposing restrictions on the uses a person 
may make of wetlands that he may own. The application of any 
of these statutes may give rise to constitutional controversies. In 
State v. 'Johnson,2 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine became 
the first of the nation's highest state courts to hear such a con-
troversy and to strike down an attempt to enforce a wetlands 
statute. The court held that the application of the Maine Wet-
lands Act3 violated the state constitution since it was tantamount 
to a "taking" of wetlands without just compensation to the af-
fected property owner.4 It also concluded that the application 
was not a proper exercise of the state's police power, since it 
deprived the appellant property owners of reasonable use of their 
land.6 Because many states have passed statutes similar to the 
Maine Wetlands Act, State v. 'Johnson stands as a dangerous prece-
dent. Should it be followed by other state courts, the nation's 
wetlands will be left unprotected from commercial exploitation. 
THE ECOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF COASTAL ESTUARIES 
Reports and statistics by marine scholars on wetland abuse 
reveal why wetlands are ecologically critical, and why their dis-
appearance is imminent if legislation such as the Maine Wetlands 
Act cannot be enforced. Wetlands generally are highly fertile and 
productive of plant and animal life-more productive usually 
than either land or sea6-and the Atlantic estuarine zone in 
particular is exception all y productive. 7 Because of this produc-
tivity, the estuarine waters are excellent nursery grounds for 
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coastal fishes and thus economically important to the nation's 
commercial fishing industry. At least two-thirds of the nation's 
commerical fish and shellfish resources and most of our marine 
sport species inhabit the estuarine environment during all or 
part of their life cycle. 8 As a productivity comparison, the average 
annual crop of shellfish and bait worms harvested from each acre 
of Maine estuaries had a market value of $33,563 while the 
market value of farm crops from a good acre of upland interior 
Maine was only $2,000 per year. 9 
Marshlands have a number of other environmentally important 
functions: they provide a place for water to be purified and stored 
for future use;10 they provide a means for flood control which is 
more efficient and less expensive than any yet devised by man;l1 
they provide sites for the wintering and nesting of waterfowl;12 
and they provide recreational outlets for man.13 
Dredging and filling activities, however, by residential and 
commercial developers interested in relatively short-term profits 
have had, and will continue to have, long-term disastrous effects 
on these important functions. Statistics compiled from 1947 to 
1967 indicate that 7.1 percent of the nation's estuaries were lost 
as the result of dredging and landfill operations.14 California 
alone lost 67 percent of its marshlands in this periodY In Maine 
only eight one-thousandths of one percent of the state's area 
remains in the form of salt marshes.16 
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM OF ESTUARY CONTROL 
Evidence of the destruction of these estuarine areas has caused 
coastal states to pass wetland conservation laws. The legislation 
reflects the determination of the states to effect meaningful en-
vironmental protection, even though it be detrimental to private 
economic interests. Because of this clash of interests many of 
these wetland laws may lead to litigation centering on the con-
stitutional issue which was analyzed in 'Johnson, that is, whether 
a state statute which restricts private use of wetlands and makes 
no provision for compensation is an unreasonable exercise of the 
state's police power. For example, the Rhode Island wetlands 
statute,17 which requires a permit for the filling of wetlands, 
authorizes the Director of Natural Resources to deny permits 
when proposed fills "would disturb the ecology of intertidal 
salt marshes."18 It should be noted that Rhode Island based its 
statute on a state constitutional guarantee of free right of 
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fishery,19 Thus in the case of a permit denial, one might anticipate 
a controversy in which this constitutional guarantee would be 
asserted against the state and federal constitutional guarantees of 
just compensation to the affected property owner. The Mas-
sachusetts Dredge and Fill Act20 leaves wholly to the discretion 
of state and municipal authorities21 the determination of whether 
a permi t to fill land should be issued or denied; it has no provi-
sion for compensating affected land owners. Other states in the 
Northeast, such as Connecticut and New Jersey, have adopted 
similar legislation for the protection of their coastal areas.22 On 
the West Coast, the California legislature recently enacted a law 
establishing the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Develop-
ment Commission.23 The Commission alone has authority to 
issue permits to persons wishing to "place fill, extract materials, 
or make any substantial change ... " on the shorelines of the 
Bay.24 
Because of its potential impact on the administration of all of 
these statutes, the decision in Johnson merits careful examination. 
THE DECISION IN STATE V. JOHNSON 
The controversy in Johnson arose when the appellants, com-
plying with the terms of the Maine Wetlands Act,25 applied for a 
permit to fill and build on coastal marsh area which they owned. 
Acting under authority of the Wetlands Act,26 the Wetlands 
Control Board denied approval of this permit for the reason that 
the requested fill would "threaten the public health and would be 
damaging to the conservation of wildlife and estuarine and 
marine fisheries."27 On its face, this action was consistent with 
two stated purposes of the Wetlands Act.28 The appellants 
sought judicial review on the grounds that the denial of their 
application amounted to an unconstitutional taking of their land 
without just compensation, and was thus an unreasonable ex-
ercise of the state's police power.29 After an initial hearing, the 
lower court determined that the constitutionality of the Wet-
lands Act was a matter to be reviewed by the Supreme Judicial 
Court.30 However, the Supreme Judicial Court, did not decide 
this issue but instead remanded the case to the lower court in 
order to obtain evidence as to the nature of the land involved and 
to determine more precisely the benefits or harm to be expected 
from the denial of the permit.31 
Prior to any decision by the lower court on remand, the ap-
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pellants began filling operations on their marshlands. The state 
thereupon sought and obtained an injunction prohibiting further 
filling. The appellants again appealed to the Supreme Judicial 
Court.32 They argued that by granting the injunction the lower 
court had sanctioned an unconstitutional taking of property by 
the state;33 in the original case, it should be noted, the ap-
pellants had argued that the taking resulted from the Board's 
denial of their application.34 The Supreme Judicial Court decided 
to consolidate the original case with the appeal from the injunc-
tion.35 It was stipulated that the evidence presented with respect 
to the appeal from the injunction would also be determinative of 
the original case.36 
The court perceived the principal issue to be a conflict between 
the public interest in thwarting the "insidious despoliation of our 
natural resources ... on the one hand, and the protection of ap-
pellants' property rights on the other .... "37 The court found 
that appellants' land was a "valuable natural resource of the 
state of Maine"38 and that it was important to the "conservation 
and developmen t of aqua tic and marine life, game birds and water-
fowl."39 However, the court also found that for appellants' pur-
poses the land would have "no commercial value whatever" if left 
unfilled.40 Weighing the ecological and economic factors, the 
court concluded that the denial of the appellants' application 
was an unreasonable exercise of the police power. The court rea-
soned that the denial of the Johnsons' permit application left 
them with land that was commercially worthless and, conse-
quently, forced them to bear an unreasonable large burden of the 
cost of the state's wetland conservation program.41 The court 
said: "A strong public desire to improve the public condition is 
not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than 
the constitutional way of paying for the change."42 
It is submitted that the court's decision was in error for four 
reasons. First, the court underestimated the fundamental im-
portance of coastal estuaries as a natural resource. The impor-
tance of coastal estuaries has been recognized not only by marine 
scholars and scientists, but also by several state legislatures on 
the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Second, the major environmental 
cases cited by the court in support of its holding are significantly 
distinguishable from Johnson, and thus do not justify the court's 
decision. Third, analogous cases decided both before and after 
'Johnson indicate that conflicts between police power and prop-
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erty rights have often been resolved in favor of police power. 
Recent decisions, especially, have recognized the need for ex-
tensive police controls over crucial environmental matters. These 
cases, then, would support a holding contrary to the one an-
nounced in Johnson. Fourth, the court ignored possible com-
promise solutions to the parties' controversy. 
The remainder of this article analyzes the cases on which the 
Johnson court relied as well as the cases which militate against 
the court's decision. Additionally, an alternative judical approach 
to the Johnson controversy is offered. 
THE CITED AUTHORITIES 
The Johnson court relied most heavily on Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon43 to justify its holding that the Wetlands Act unduly 
infringed on the Johnsons' property rights without according 
them just compensation. The Mahon case involved an attempt by 
appellee to enjoin the Pennsylvania Coal Company from mining 
under property in which appellee had only surface rights.44 At 
the basis of Mahon's defense was the Kohler Act,45 which 
prohibited the mining of anthracite coal when mining would 
tend to cause a subsidence of the surface. The United States 
Supreme Court ruled against M:ahon, finding the Kohler Act to 
be an overextension of the state's police power.46 According to the 
Court, the Act deprived the Pennsylvania Coal Company, the 
owner of the mining rights under the Mahon residence, of any 
commercial return on its investmentY The Court stated that 
such a deprivation was equivalent to destroying or appropriating 
the property ou trigh t. 48 
The Johnson court erred in relying upon this decision as 
Mahon is distinguishable on its facts. In Mahon, the Court found 
that it was not the purpose of the Kohler Act to provide for the 
safety of the public at large; rather the Act was to protect only a 
particular class of individuals, the surface owners.49 The threat-
ened damage to such owners was not a matter of general public 
interest and was not "sufficient to warrant a destruction of the 
coal company's constitutionally protected rights."60 Furthermore, 
the Court maintained that since Mahon had purchased only the 
surface rights to the land from the coal company, he had assumed 
the risk of the company's continuing to mine beneath the 
surface.51 The dangers incident to such a risk could not later be 
eliminated through resort to the police power. The Court denied 
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Mahon's request for an injunction on the ground that the 
Kohler Act unconstitutionally served only a select class of per-
sons, that is, surface owners like Mahon, and extended to them 
"greater rights than they bought."52 
Since the 'Johnson court, unlike the Mahon Court, could not 
assert that the statute before it served no general public purpose, 
it confronted a problem more difficult than that which the 
Mahon Court had to decide. The rationale applied in deciding the 
Mahon case was, therefore, not readily transferable to the 'John-
son case, and it would seem then that the 'Johnson court erred in 
applying the Mahon rationale. 
The 'Johnson court also cited two Massachusetts cases, Com-
missioner oj Natural Resources v. Volpe53 and MacGibbon v. 
Duxbury/4 as reinforcement for its decision. The court deemed it 
significant that the fact situations of the three cases were 
paralle1.55 Volpe involved an application of the Massachusetts 
Dredge and Fill Act, which, as mentioned above, has purposes 
similar to those of the Maine Wetlands Act.56 MacGibbon in-
volved wetland restrictions imposed by a town zoning ordinance. 
The 'Johnson court analogized MacGibbon's zoning laws to the 
Maine Wetlands ActY It stated that zoning regulations, like the 
wetland statute, emanate from the governmental police power 
and are intended to advance the public's health and safety.58 
Both Volpe and MacGibbon involved plaintiff property owners 
who sought to fill their marshlands for commercial develop-
ment. The reviewing authorities in each case denied the plaintiffs 
permits to fil1.69 The denials were considered necessary to preserve 
the ecological benefits of the salt marshes in question.60 Both 
courts, like the 'Johnson court, were asked to review the alleged 
arbitrariness of the permit denials as well as the denials' effect on 
the marshlands' value to the property owners. The MacGibbon 
court remanded the case to the Duxbury Board of Appeals for fur-
ther findings as to the potential damage from the landfill and the 
prospective loss to the landowner.61 The Volpe court, after revers-
ing a lower court injunction against further landfill, likewise 
remanded.62 It directed the lower court to reassess the controversy 
in light of such pertinent data as the practical uses of the land 
in its natural state, the market value of the land both with and 
without the fill restrictions, and the town zoning laws.63 
Since neither Volpe nor MacGibbon resulted in a final decision 
as to the constitutional issue arising from the permit denials, 
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it was inappropriate for the Johnson court to cite either case in 
support of its conclusion that the Johnsons' property rights had 
been violated through an unreasonable exercise of the police 
power. Volpe and MacGibbon simply held that prior to the court's 
passing on the issue of unconstitutional use of police power, a 
study should be conducted as to alternative uses for the land in 
question. Had the Johnson court been as investigative as the 
Volpe court, that is, had it requested specific data on remand, 
conceivably it might have been persuaded to decide the case 
otherwise. 
Johnson cited two other conservation cases as examples of 
unconstitutional takings. In the first case, Dooley v. Town Plan 
and Zoning Commission,64 the plaintiff owned property which had 
recen tl y been rezoned as a flood plain area.65 The zoning change 
prohibited most excavation and filling, and permitted use of the 
land only for such purposes as parks, playgrounds, wildlife 
sanctuaries and agriculture.66 It had been plaintiff's original in-
ten tion to develop the land for residential purposes. The court 
held that the zoning change was unreasonable and confiscatoryY 
Close as it may appear to the Johnson dispute, this case is also 
distinguishable. First, in Johnson the Wetlands Board found that 
the proposed filling of the Johnson property would endanger 
public health and safety.68 There was no such finding in Dooley. 
Second, in Johnson, the evidence indicated that filling of plain-
tiffs' marshland would cause substantial damage to the ecology 
of the wetlands. By contrast, the evidence in Dooley indicated 
that much of the plaintiff's property was situated on unexcep-
tional high land69 and that, therefore, its development would not 
be ecologically disastrous. 
In the second case, Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. 
Town Plan and Zoning Commission,70 a zoning change was ef-
fected to aid in the con trol of floods and to provide for open 
spaces. 71 The change permi tted property owners to make only 
certain uses of their land, and these uses were to be conserva-
tionist in character. 72 The court struck down the zoning law as a 
taking of private property without just compensation and as 
therefore an overextension of the police power. 73 This decision, 
however, is also distinguishable from Johnson. Although floods 
may certainly visit damage upon the public, the public does 
recover from floods. As to the conservation and enjoyment of 
open space, the public may have several choices available to it 
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and thus need not look exclusively to any single area. With 
respect to wetlands, however, the public interest is more vulner-
able to critical harm. If they are filled, the ecological loss is 
virtually unrecoverable. The loss of wetlands, moreover, is not 
comparable to the loss of ordinary open space. Apart from differ-
ences in ecological functions, wetlands must be distinguished 
from ordinary open space in terms of geographic occurrence; 
wetlands are far more rare. 74 
Each of the above cases, then, may be distinguished from 
Johnson ei ther on their facts or on their disposition. None of 
them, consequently, lends significant support to the holding an-
nounced in Johnson. 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
There have been a number of other decisions, both before and 
after Johnson, which have upheld police power restrictions on 
property uses that threaten the public interest, even though the 
restrictions caused economic losses to the property owners. 
Mugler v. Kansas,15 decided in 1887, involved the alleged right of 
a brewery owner to receive compensation from the state for 
property devaluation which resulted from a newly enacted state 
law forbidding the sale and manufacture of liquor. 76 Justice 
Harlan, writing the opinion for the United States Supreme Court, 
denied the plaintiff compensation for his loss on the ground that 
the statute did not appropriate property. He reasoned that the 
statute imposed only a limitation on the property's use, which 
use the state had deemed to be harmful to the public: 
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are 
declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, 
or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a 
taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit.77 
In other decisions, the Supreme Court reacted as it did in Mugler 
and subordinated private economic loss to the right of the state 
to regulate noxious activity of property owners. 78 It is submitted 
that the Johnson court should have regarded the J ohnsons' filling 
of their marshland as such a noxious activity. The filling was 
deleterious to the public well-being since it was totally destruc-
tive of a unique natural resource. Consequently, the state's at-
tempt to regulate and preserve the property should have been 
upheld. 
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Relatively recent decisions in environmental controversies have 
similarly upheld police power restrictions on private property in-
terests. For exa~ple, in the New York case of A. E. Nettleton Co. 
v. Diamond/9 the-State Court of Appeals decided that a statute 
prohibiting the sale of skins or hides of endangered species of wild 
animals was a valid exercise of the police power. 80 The court over-
ruled the lower court decision which held that the statute uncon-
stitutionally interfered with the property rights of the plaintiff. 81 
It stated that the wild animals which were listed as endangered 
were a vital asset to the people of New York (even though many 
obviously were not indigenous to the state) and that "the pro-
tection of these animals [was] essential for the welfare of our 
society."82 In contrast, although one of the express intentions of 
the Maine Wetlands Act was similar to the principal in ten tion of 
the New York statute, i.e., the intention to protect wildlife,83 the 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court placed private economic interest 
in ascendancy over state police power. It might be argued that 
the decision to uphold the regulation in Nettleton a fortiori should 
have resulted in a similar decision in Johnson since the threatened 
natural resources in Johnson were strictly endemic. 
Another recent case, Adams v. Shannon,84 upheld a California 
statute prohibiting the importation and possession of piranha 
fish. The statute was held to be a valid exercise of the police 
power to protect local species of aquatic life, regardless of the 
economic interest of tropical fish dealers.85 As compared with 
Adams, Johnson would again seem to have been an easier case to 
decide in favor of the environmentalist viewpoint. It seems likely 
that local marine life would be more extensively harmed by de-
struction of their habitats than by occasional encounters with 
predator fish like the piranha. The predator rarely if ever destroys 
all of its existing prey. The destruction of habitat, however, not 
only may devastate present generations but also may prevent 
the very existence of future generations. The regulation at-
tempted in Johnson thus would seem to have been more impera-
tive than that effected in Adams. 
The holding of another California case which was decided after 
Johnson contrasts sharply with the holding of the Maine case. 
The fact situations in the two cases were strikingly similar and 
the issues raised for decision were the same. Yet the courts dif-
fered dramatically in their resolution of the conflict between 
police power and private property rights. In Candlestick Proper-
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ties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Com-
mission,86 plaintiff was the owner of tidal land which abutted the 
Bay. Plaintiff had purchased the land with the intent of filling it 
for commercial uses, and, as in Johnson, plaintiff argued that the 
property had no value if it could not be used commercially.87 
The legislation in question in Candlestick was the McAteer 
Petris Act,88 which had provisionally established the San Fran-
cisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC), 
whose purpose was to prepare a comprehensive plan for the con-
servation of San Francisco Bay.89 The BeDC was also em-
powered to issue or deny permi ts for dredging or filling in the 
Bay.90 In Candlestick, the BCDC denied the plaintiff's permit to 
fill, and the plaintiff appealed claiming that the BCDC's permit 
power was an unconstitutional extension of the state's police 
power since it involved taking of property without just compensa-
tion.91 Although the issue, therefore, was the same as that in-
volved in Johnson, the two courts reached contrary results. 
The Candlestick court accepted the legislature's determinations 
on the basic ecological issues: 
[T]he Legislature has determined that the bay is the most valuable 
single natural resource of the entire region and changes in one part 
of the bay may also affect all other parts; that the present unco-
ordinated, haphazard manner in which the bay is being filled threat-
ens the bay itself and is therefore inimical to the welfare of both present 
and future residents of the bay area; and that a regional approach is 
necessary to protect the public interest in the bay. In order to protect 
the bay during the formulation of the conservation and development 
plan for the bay the Commission must have the power to regulate any 
proposed project that involves placing fill in the bay. [Citations 
omitted.)92 
The court was of the opinion that the police power regulations 
should not be summarily overturned. 
It is a well settled rule that determination of the necessity and form 
of regulations enacted pursuant to the police power "is primarily a 
legislative and not ajudicial function, and is to be tested in the courts 
not by what the judges individually or collectively may think of the 
wisdom or necessity of a particular regulation, but solely by the 
answer to the question is there any reasonable basis in fact to support 
the legislative determination of the regulation's wisdom and neces-
sity?" [Citation omitted]. Furthermore, even if the reasonableness 
of the regulation is fairly debatable, the legislative determination will 
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not be disturbed [Citation omitted] .... In view of the necessity for 
controlling the filling of the bay, as expressed by the Legislature in 
the provisions discussed above, it is clear that the restriction imposed 
does not go beyond proper regulation .... 93 
It is submitted that Candlestick properly resolved the constitu-
tional issue inherent in wetlands legislation. Since wetlands are 
acknowledged to be an invaluable natural resource with unique 
ecological significance to the public, wetlands legislation seems to 
be not merely an acceptable exercise of the police power but an 
imperative exercise thereof. Candlestick, together with Nettleton 
and Adams, is evidence of a judicial trend toward the acceptance 
of increased police activity in environmental matters, and Mugler 
gives this current movement important historic support. Re-
grettably, however 'Johnson defies this enlightened trend. 
AN ALTERNATIVE ApPROACH 
It should be recognized that Candlestick does not offer the only 
reasonable solution to the problem of wetlands abuse by private 
landowners. An alternative solution might be to urge a com-
promise between the wetlands owner and the regulatory agency. 
Yet even this alternative was avoided in 'Johnson. The court did 
not suggest that a reasonable accommodation be made between 
the J ohnsons and the Wetlands Board, even though such an ac-
commodation could have been grounded on the statutory pro-
vision which allows the applicant to amend his proposa1. 94 It 
would have been within the court's province to urge the plaintiffs 
to submit a compromise application, whereby they would have 
filled only specified portions of their land or would have used 
special construction methods in order to avoid severe ecological 
damage. The 'Johnson court would have found precedent for such 
action in Vartelas u. Water Resources Commission. 95 In that case 
the court upheld a police power restriction upon the construction 
of a concrete building in a flood plain zone. 96 However, in con-
sideration of the landowner's economic interests, the court al-
lowed that an alternative structure would be acceptable. 97 Unlike 
the Vartelas court, however, the 'Johnson court took an all-or-
nothing approach, and, having done so, arrived at the worst pos-
sible decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The reasoning of the 'Johnson court was too narrowly framed. 
The court underestimated the significance of the environmental 
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data and policy reflected in the statute. Moreover, it did not 
thoroughly examine the facts of the cases on which it purported 
to base its decision. It also failed to evince the environmental 
sensitivity of the courts which decided the Adams, Nettleton, and 
Candlestick cases. And finally, the court did not actively explore 
the possibility of a compromise solution to the controversy 
before it. 
Cases involving environmental regulation based on the state 
police power require the courts to be attentive to new scientific 
information and to shifting societal values. 
[T]he police power, as such, is not confined within the narrow cir-
cumspection of precedents, resting upon past conditions which do 
not cover and control present-day conditions obviously calling for 
revised regulations to promote the health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare of the public ... as a commonwealth develops ... , the 
police power likewise develops ... to meet the changed and changing 
condi tions .... "us 
··.·--e:..e-<e--·.·· 
.:. Staff member, Environmental Affairs. 
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